DoS and Authentication in Wireless Public Access Networks

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Outline

 Introduction Access control framework Wireless security ◆ IEEE 802.11 and 802.1X Public-key based secure internet access ◆ SIAP、 SLAP Other DoS attacks Conclusion

Introduction

 Every mechanism has the potential of creating a vulnerability or enabling denial of service (DoS) attacks. Less mechanism is better, restricting the provided services to the ones that are really essential to creating a secure solution.

 Secure association is an important service to provide.

Introduction (cont.)

 DoS attacks effective are made possible by the lack of implementation of essential services or wrong assumptions made about the environment.
 SIAP/SLAP can be used to implement a secure association service and avoid the DoS attacks.

An access control framework Mutual authentication Flexible authorization Access verification (message authentication code, replay detection) Interoperability Simple user interface Data confidentiality and integrity

An access control framework (cont.)

 Authentication protocol provides mutual authentication and sets up fresh session keys and parameters.

 Lower-layer protocol receives the parameters from the authentication protocol and use them to provide confidentiality, integrity.

 The scheme enforced the bond between the IP address and the session keys while eliminating specific attacks.

Wireless Security

Access point authentication

- Association is the service used to establish access point/station mapping.
- Use an authentication server (AS) hidden behind the access points.
- The access control mechanism should provide the client with access point authentication.
- Authentication should be executed before association in order to eliminate DoS attacks.

IEEE 802.11 Authentication

 The standard had very limited objectives when dealing with authentication and confidentiality.

It defined an authentication protocol based on a shared key know by APs and client machines. A four-message handshake is performed in order to authenticate the client.
The authentication mechanism is turned off when the protocol is integrated with the 802.1X framework.

IEEE 802.11 Association


 A finite-state machine (FSM) in the standard defines three states for a client:

- Unauthenticated/unassociated
- Authenticated/unassociated
- Authenticated/associated

 The FSM requires the client to run the authentication algorithm before it can associate with a AP.

IEEE 802.1X

 Port-based access control The standard uses the EAP (Extensible) Authentication Protocol) protocol as a tunnel between client and server, passing through the access point. Between the AP and the authentication server, RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial In User Service) is the option as the encapsulation protocol.



Limitations of IEEE 802.1X

- One of the limitations of 802.1X is that the authenticator, AP, is never authenticated by the client.
 802.1X involves far too many protocols and encourages incompatibility between domains.
- Its integration with 802.11 is poor and has been shown to be vulnerable to various attacks.

Public-key-based secure Internet Access




Figure 1: Protocol stack.

 Both protocol are implemented in the clients and access points. SIAP (Secure Internet Access Protocol)

 SIAP client performing an authentication handshake with the SIAP server in the access point.

 The three-message handshake provides mutual authentication and supplies the client with fresh session keys, tied to a given IP address selected by the SIAP server.

 In SIAP, every client and access point has a public key signed by a known Certification Authority (CA).

SIAP Handshake

Handshake




Figure 2: SIAP handshake.

SLAP (Secure Link Access Protocol)

 Located above the link layer, intercepting and processing all incoming and outgoing frames. SLAP can be seen as SIAP's agent over link-layer frames, providing confidentiality, sender authentication, integrity, and replay detection.

SLAP

 After the client is authenticated, the generated keys are passed from SIAP to SLAP.

 All frames receive the SLAP header and can be encrypted and authenticated after the security state is set in both client and AP.

Encryption and Authentication

- SLAP uses AES in counter mode to encrypt the SLAP packet.
 - → fast implementation in both hardware and software.
- SLAP uses HMAC-MD5 as the authentication algorithm.
 - → fast implementation as it is based in the MD5 hashing function.

AES (Advance Encryption Standard) Select the "Rijndael" cryptographic algorithm for the proposed AES. Support 128,192,256-bit keys and block size. AES-CTR mode provides high parallelism, each plaintext block can be encrypted independently.

Authenticate and Associate The association handshake is modified to use a key shared between client and AP and provide mutual authentication. Before a client gets associated with an AP, it needs to set up an association key by executing the SIAP handshake. SIAP messages destined to the AP are not processed by the SLAP module.




Figure 5: SIAP and SLAP integration.

Flexibility

 By making SLAP link-layer independent, the architecture can be used in non-802.11 networks.

 As the encryption performed by WEP is part of the link-layer protocol, the access points are necessarily the other endpoint of the secure channel.




Figure 6: SIAP and SLAP in a wireless network.




Figure 7: SIAP and SLAP in an Ethernet network.

Other DoS attacks Pre-authentication attacks Some security architectures require the client to execute some configuration steps before it can go through the authentication process. Attacks on authorization Giving the same key to multiple clients can be considered a flaw in authorization and is insecure. Attacks on verification

Based on the lack of important services, such as replay detection or sender authentication.

Preliminary results

• SLAP overhead: $50 \mu s \sim 330 \mu s$ (client) $10 \mu s \sim 170 \mu s$ (AP) The overhead has little effect over representative TCP connections. The SIAP handshake was measured to terminate in hundreds of milliseconds, mainly due to the private key operations incurred by SIAP.

Conclusion

 Most of the attacks are caused by the lack of important services, such as replay detection and access point authentication.

 The architecture, composed of the SIAP and SLAP protocols, that solves the problem by coalescing essential services in a secure way.